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SAFEGUARDING EMPLOYMENT FOR U.S.
WORKERS: DO UNDOCUMENTEDS
TAKE AWAY JOBS?
B Y STEPHEN A. R OSENBA UM*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Immigration Reform
September 1, 1988 marked the one-year anniversary of "em-
ployer sanctions" for the hiring of undocumented workers by
United States employers.' Until passage of the Immigration Re-
form and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA),2 regulating the employment
of aliens was held to be only a "peripheral concern" of the federal
immigration statute.
3
It is now indisputable that Congress intends to use the immi-
gration laws as a tool to protect American labor.4 Under IRCA, it
is unlawful to knowingly employ an alien who is not "lawfully ad-
mitted for permanent residence" or who is "unauthorized to be...
employed." 5 Although the federal immigration statute now en-
shrines the principle that denying work opportunities to aliens pro-
tects jobs for Americans, 6 this seemingly common sense assumption
* Staff Attorney, California Rural Legal Assistance. Lecturer in Law, University
of California, Berkeley. University of California, Berkeley, Master of Public Policy
(1979), J.D. (1980). The views expressed here are not necessarily those of California
Rural Legal Assistance, its clients, or its Board of Directors. The author wishes to
thank Ralph Santiago Abascal and Alberto Saldamando for their comments on an ear-
lier version of this article.
1. Civil fines ranging from $500 to $10,000 per violation may be levied for hiring
"unauthorized aliens." Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended by the
Immigration Reform and Control Act, § 274A(i)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(i)(2), 8 C.F.R.
§§ 274a.9-274a. 10. The sanctions went into effect on September 1, 1987.
2. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1160 el seq).
See § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a controlling the unlawful employment of aliens.
3. National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. INS, 743 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th
Cir. 1984) [hereinafter NCIR, Inc, v. INS], citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S.
883, 892 (1984). See infra text accompanying notes 20-28 for a description of the INA.
4. The so-called "employer sanctions" are a cornerstone of IRCA. See generally,
§ 274A. The chief congressional committee report accompanying IRCA notes, e.g.,
that "[e]mployment is the magnet that attracts aliens here illegally or, in the case of
nonimmigrants, leads them to accept employment in violation of their status." H.R.
REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 46, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5650.
5. INA § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. See infra text accompanying notes 23-27.
6. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary wrote about employer penalties: "As
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obscures the complex relationship between immigrant and domestic
labor.
B. TheNo-WorkRule
For more than five years, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (hereinafter, INS) has been stymied in its efforts to imple-
ment a rule prohibiting aliens from working while out on bond
pending deportation or exclusion. Like defendants awaiting trial in
the criminal justice system, aliens charged with violating U.S. immi-
gration laws are typically allowed to post bond pending a hearing
on the merits. 7  The U.S. Attorney General has the authority to
prescribe conditions governing an alien's release under bond,8 a pe-
riod that could take a year or more. From 1973 to 1983, INS regu-
lations authorized District Directors, with approval from the
Regional Commissioner, to bar employment as a condition of re-
lease under bond in individual cases.9
In November 1983, INS issued amended regulations discontin-
uing these individualized determinations of work prohibition.10
The final regulations provide that:
Only those aliens who upon application... establish compelling
reasons for granting employment authorization may be author-
ized to accept employment."I
No due process hearing is to be held in conjunction with such
an application.12 The application may be made to an INS district
director,' 3 whose discretion in granting employment authorization
is to be guided by four factors, one of which is "safeguarding em-
ployment opportunities for United States citizens and lawful perma-
nent resident aliens .... ,,14
The regulations were preliminarily enjoined in 1983 by a U.S.
district court in a decision affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of
long as greater job opportunities are available to foreign nationals who succeed in physi-
cally entering this country, intense illegal immigration pressure on the United States
will continue." S. REP. No. 132, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 8. Its counterpart in the House
stated that these sanctions "will deter aliens from entering illegally or violating their
status in search of employment." H.R. REP. No. 682 supra note 4.
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a).
8. Aliens are deportable from the United States for reasons set out at § 125 1(a) or
excludable under the terms of § 1182(a). Arrest, detention, and the posting of bond are
provided under § 1252(a).
9. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(ii) (1983).
10. 48 Fed. Reg. 51142-51144 (1983).
11. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(iii).
12. The no-work condition may be reviewed in the context of a bond re-determina-
tion hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(c). See also § 274a.13, a new regulation which elabo-
rates on the application procedure.
13. 8 C.F.R. § 109.1(b)(8) (1986). This section was subsequently renumbered and
revised after passage of IRCA. It is now § 274a.12(c)(13).
14. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(iii)(A) (1984). This factor was deleted from § 274a.12
(c)(13), the parallel regulation promulgated in 1987.
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Appeals.15 The same district court ruled two years later on a mo-
tion for summary judgment that the regulations exceeded the au-
thority of the Attorney General under the immigration statute.
That order was upheld by the Court of Appeals, 16 but vacated by
the Supreme Court which remanded the case for further considera-
tion in light of IRCA. 17 In December 1987, the district court held
that IRCA does not expand the Attorney General's authority to set
bond conditions as provided in the challenged regulations.' 8
As this article demonstrates, the no-work rule is founded on a
faulty hypothesis: illegal workers displace legal workers. While this
may be the case in very limited circumstances, it by no means ex-
plains why United States laborers suffer unemployment, substan-
dard working conditions, and low wages. For that reason alone, the
rule makes for poor public policy, and should be permanently
enjoined.
C. Who Is Affected?
The aliens potentially affected by these regulations are those
who 1) are not authorized to be in the United States and/or 2) are
not authorized to accept employment here. Those aliens who meet
the first or both of these conditions are commonly known as illegal
or undocumented aliens.19
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), as
amended, 20 is a comprehensive scheme which covers all aspects of
admission of aliens to the United States, whether for business or
pleasure, or to obtain permanent resident status. 21 The Act divides
aliens into two classes. The first class, nonimmigrant aliens, is es-
tablished by 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (15) (A) - (M), which creates thir-
15. NCIR, Inc. v. INS, 743 F.2d 1365, supra note 3, upholding Order of Dec. 16,
1983 (U.S. Dist. Ct., C.D. Calif., No. Civ. 83-7297 KN).
16. NCIR, Inc. v. INS, 791 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1986), upholding Order of Mar. 7,
1985 (U.S. Dist. Ct., C.D. Calif., No. Civ. 83-7297 KN)..
17. -U.S.-, 107 S.Ct. 1881 (mem.) (1987). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in turn remanded the case to the district court. NCIR, Inc. v. INS, (Order of May 19,
1987, No. Civ. 85-6131).
18. Order of Dec. 31, 1987. (U.S. Dist. Ct., C.D. Calif., No. Civ. 83-7297 KN).
19. The terms illegal and undocumented are often used interchangeably to denote
an alien (immigrant or nonimmigrant) whose presence in the United States is in viola-
tion of U.S. immigration laws. Such a person may have entered the country
clandestinely or may have entered by presenting fraudulent documents, with a valid
temporary entry permit, (the terms of which were violated by overstaying the allotted
period), and/or by accepting unauthorized employment. Many undocumented persons
are actually documentable. See Cornelius, The Future of Mexican Immigration in Cali-
fornia: A New Perspective for Public Policy, WORKING PAPERS IN U.S.-MEXICAN STUD-
IES, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, n.1 (1981); and V.
BRIGGS, IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN LABOR FORCE 129-30 (1984)
[hereinafter, IMMIGRATION POLICY] for a discussion of the political and academic util-
ity of these terms.
20. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.
21. See H.R. Doc. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
1988]
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teen categories of aliens who may come to the United States
temporarily without being subject to numerical limitations or quo-
tas. 22 The second class, immigrant aliens, includes every alien who
does not fall into one of the categories of nonimmigrants.
With exceptions, as noted below, each alien admitted for per-
manent residence or who later becomes eligible for permanent resi-
dence is chargeable against an annual quota. 23
The vast majority of incoming immigrants are granted visas
with no consideration of the impact their employment will have on
U.S. workers or the economy. The alien spouse, parent or child of a
U.S. citizen who receives a visa to enter the United States falls
within this category. These immigrants are not subject to annual
quotas24 and comprise the largest group of incoming immigrants.
Likewise, lawful permanent resident aliens returning from
abroad, religious ministers, certain doctors, certain former U.S.
government employees and other categories of special immigrants 25
may enter the U.S. as non-quota immigrants without reference to
possible employment. Aside from the third and sixth preference
categories, 26 all other quota immigrants, who may obtain 80% of
quota visas each year, are statutorily permitted to enter the country
without any inquiry as to the displacement they might cause U.S.
workers.
27
Until passage of IRCA the INA's only concern with protecting
domestic labor was found in the section which denied admission to
persons who lacked work authorization. 28 This was not, however, a
prohibition on employment of undocumenteds.
I. Two THEORIES OF JOB DISPLACEMENT
Mass migration to the United States is most often explained by
the push-pull theory, whereby workers are pushed from their coun-
22. Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 665 (1978). Congress defined nonimmigrant
classes to provide for the needs of international diplomacy, tourism, and commerce,
each of which requires that aliens be admitted to the United States from time to time on
a temporary basis, and all of which would be hampered if every alien entering the
United States were subject to the numerical limitations and stricter entry conditions
placed on immigrant aliens.
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a). Immigrants exempted from the numerical limitations are
immediate relatives of United States citizens, certain defined special immigrants, and
aliens who are admitted or granted asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1157 or 1158. The cate-
gory of special immigrants includes lawful permanent resident aliens returning from
temporary visits abroad, certain former citizens, former U.S. Government employees,
and certain medical doctors and religious ministers. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(27).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a).
25. See supra note 22.
26. These preference or quota categories are allotted to skilled professionals and
unskilled laborers, respectively. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3), (6).
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(e).
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(14).
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try of origin by marginal living conditions and pulled to the U.S. by
the promise of better jobs and a higher standard of living.29 Schol-
ars have posited two general theories to describe the effect of these
immigrant workers on the domestic work force: the Direct and In-
direct Displacement Theories.
30
A. Unauthorized Laborers Do Not Directly Displace
American Workers
The most elementary is the so-called direct or one-to-one dis-
placement theory, which took root during the last decade. It says
that for every undocumented alien expelled, a job would open up
for an unemployed American. In other words, legals and illegals
are competing for the same jobs with the same firms. One-to-one
displacement analysis follows the classical law of supply and de-
mand: The increasing supply of immigrant laborers cuts the price
(wage) of laborers. As overall wages decrease, so does the attrac-
tiveness of these jobs for U.S. workers.31
Writing about the large-scale, forced repatriation of Mexicans
during the 1930's Depression and the 1950's Operation Wetback,
Law Professor Gerald L6pez notes that:
Despite scant supporting evidence, the one-to-one displacement
theory became part of the national mentality. Dormant in good
times, the theory [is] resurrected at times of high
unemployment.
32
A modern supporter of this theory, Ex-INS Commissioner General
Leonard F. Chapman, has been accused by some scholars as propa-
gating a "simple-minded assumption... that every illegal employed
in this country is taking a job that would otherwise be held by a
legal resident."'3 3 Under Chapman's command during the mid-
1970's, the INS was accused of "present[ing] hypothetical - really
29. See, e.g., Ravenstein, The Laws of Migration, 52 J. ROYAL STATISTICAL SOC'Y
241-301 (1889), and the more contemporary Lee, A Theory of Migration, 3 DEMOGRA-
PHY 47 (1966). For a critique of the push-pull theory, see L6pez, Undocumented Mexi-
can Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615
(1981).
30. These two theories represent opposite ends of the spectrum. Somewhere in the
middle is the "triage" theory described by Agricultural Economist Philip Martin. See
Martin, Illegal Immigration and the Colonization of the American Labor Market 13-14
(1986) (unpublished paper for Center for Immigration Studies).
31. Flores, The Impact of Undocumented Migration on the United States Labor
Market, 5 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. 287 (1983) (citing congressional testimony of Labor
Economist Vernon Briggs, Jr.). See also, Briggs, Labor Market Aspects of Mexican Im-
migration to the United States in the 1970's, in VIEWS ACROSS THE BORDER 204-05
(Ross, ed. 1978).
32. L6pez, supra note 29, at 633.
33. P. ERLICH, L. BILDERBACK & A. ERLICH, THE GOLDEN DOOR: INTERNA-




invented-figures [on the number of unauthorized aliens] as fact."'3 4
Since the recent wave of immigration began, scholars and pol-
icy makers have spent much time analyzing the displacement con-
cept. The staff of the Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy, whose voluminous report set the stage for the re-
cent national debate on immigration law reform, noted two compet-
ing hypotheses on whether undocumented immigrants displace U.S.
workers: (1) That such workers take jobs away from young un-
skilled U.S. workers; and (2) that such workers take jobs that U.S.
workers don't want. Their report concludes that "[tihere is no
strong evidence to support either hypothesis. . . 35 One problem
with almost all analyses is the lack of data-or reliable data--on the
total number 36 of undocumented aliens 37 and where they work. 38
The fact remains that the displacement, or dislocation, of U.S.
workers is unproven. As Anthropologist and U.S.-Mexico Special-
ist Leo R. ChAvez stated:
There is not one study I know of, and we have done an exhaus-
tive search, that can state emphatically that this type of disloca-
tion occurs a great deal. 39
One measure of displacement is the number of jobs actually
filled by domestics after the removal of undocumented aliens. In its
1986 survey of the existing literature, the U.S. General Accounting
Office was unable to make any inferences about this form of dis-
34. Id. at 178.
35. Background Paper.- The Economic Impacts of Illegal Migrants, SELECT COM-
MISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 1 (1980) (unpublished report edited
by staff) [hereinafter, Economic Impacts].
36. Jeffery S. Passel of the U.S. Bureau of the Census has suggested that there were
2,057,000 undocumented aliens living in the U.S. in 1980, half of whom were living in
California. Passel, Immigration to the United States 12 (1985) (unpublished paper); see
also, Passel and Woodrow, Geographic Distribution of Undocumented Immigrants." Esti-
mates of Undocumented Aliens Counted in the 1980 Census by State, 18 INT'L MIGRA-
TION REV. 642 (1984). The President's Council of Economic Advisors has noted that
estimates of the undocumented population range from 2 to 15 million, but relied in its
analysis on the Bureau of the Census' estimate of 4 to 6 million for 1985. Report of the
President's Council of Economic Advisors 219 (1986).
37. In general, the research on the question of worker displacement compares legal
with illegal labor. The former includes citizens, lawful permanent resident aliens and
other immigrants legally residing in the United States. In this article they are referred
to as citizens and legal residents or domestic or U.S. labor. The latter term, illegal, is
reserved for that group of aliens described supra note 19. Occasionally, the displace-
ment literature compares domestic with immigrant labor. See, e.g., K. McCarthy and R.
Burciaga Valdez, Current and Future Effects of Mexican Immigration in California
(Executive Summary) (Rand Publication No. R-3365/1-CR 1985). Although this no-
menclature obscures the distinction just stated, studies using these terms may be the
best available for comparing legal and illegal work forces.
38. Briggs, Methods of Analysis of Illegal Immigration into the United States, 18
INT'L MIGRATION REV. 623, 634 (1984).
39. Hearing for Preliminary Injunction, Reporter's Transcript at 82 (1983), NCIR,
Inc. v. INS, (No. Civ. 83-7927 KN) [hereinafter Hearing].
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placement, owing to the lack of data.4°
B. Displacement, If Any, Is Limited To Certain Markets
The theory of indirect displacement states that U.S. Workers
are being driven out of certain jobs or industries because of the in-
flux of undocumented immigrant laborers. It is not at the aggregate
or macro level of the economy, but at the selective or labor market
level, that their impact may be keenly felt.4 1 Economists have iden-
tified three labor markets in this analysis: the substandard, secon-
dary, and primary.
42
The substandard market is one where unlawful wages and
working conditions persist despite legislation to the contrary. This
market is dominated almost exclusively by undocumented workers
as they are the most easily exploitable. It is unlikely that jobs in this
sector would otherwise be held by domestic workers.
43
At the other extreme is the primary market with high-paying
jobs, substantial fringe benefits and desirable working conditions.
Undocumenteds employed in this market, such as manufacturing
and construction laborers, may displace domestic workers who are
readily available. 44 Undocumenteds may be preferred in this mar-
ket because they are less likely to unionize, to complain about safety
violations, or to file complaints based on sex or national origin dis-
crimination.45 In addition, undocumented laborers have lower rates
of absenteeism than citizens and lawful residents. 46 Although the
number of undocumenteds in this sector is very small, they have not
40. U.S. General Accounting Office, Illegal Aliens: Limited Research Suggests Ille-
gal Aliens May Displace Native Workers, 9 GAO/PEMD-86-9 BR (1986) [hereinafter
GAO 1986]. Two years later, the GAO issued its findings on the related question of
whether undocumented workers depress wages and worsen working conditions for U.S.
workers. The answer was a very qualified yes: In some cases these workers "exert
downward pressure on wages and working conditions within low-wage, low-skilled jobs
in certain labor markets," but illegal status is only one factor which may depress wages
and conditions. U.S. General Accounting Office, Illegal Aliens: Influence of Illegal
Workers on Wages and Working Conditions of Legal Workers, 1-2 GAO/PEMD-88-13
BR (1988) [hereinafter GAO 1988]. The report stressed the incomplete and uneven
data contained in the underlying studies and the need for longitudinal wage data. Id. at
1, 16, 22.
41. See, e.g., M. PIORE, BIRDS OF PASSAGE: MIGRANT LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETIES (1979), and North and Houstoun, The Characteristics and Role of Illegal
Aliens in the U.S. Labor Market: An Exploratory Study (1976) reprinted in SELECT
COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, [hereinafter, SELECT COMMISSION] App. E.: Papers on
Illegal Migration to the United States (1981). Professor L6pez refers to this as the so-
phisticated version of displacement. L6pez, supra note 29 at 634.
42. See BRIGGS, IMMIGRATION POLICY, supra note 19, at 160-65.
43. Id. at 161.
44. Id. at 165.
45. Id.
46. Martin, supra note 30, at 22. See D. HUDDLE, A. CORWIN & G. MAcDON-
ALD, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: JOB DISPLACEMENT AND SOCIAL COSTS, American Im-
migration Control Foundation, 16 (1985) [hereinafter, D. HUDDLE], for additional
1988]
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escaped the attention of the INS. It is precisely because there is
little debate about the effects of job displacement that the INS has
concentrated its enforcement activities here.47
Labor Economist Richard Mines observes that the INS errone-
ously "target[s] high wage job sites on the assumption that, if they
get rid of highly paid undocumented workers, then domestics can
take their places." This practice, he reasons, ignores the process by
which employers use undocumenteds or recent immigrants to de-
grade their labor markets. 4 Rather than deter the employment of
unauthorized workers, these periodic raids may actually increase re-
liance on an undocumented work force; it allows employers to weed
out those who are not afraid of asserting their work place rights and
to selectively re-hire the apprehended aliens once they return after
deportation or voluntary departure.
49
It is in the secondary market where most undocumenteds may
be employed.50 This is where wages are low, albeit in compliance
with minimum wage laws, and working conditions and benefits are
marginal. These are jobs which are physically demanding and may
require work at night or on weekends. Farm workers, restaurant
employees, maintenance workers and other manual laborers com-
pose the secondary work force. Typically, citizens and lawful resi-
dent workers do not last long in these occupations. A hotel, light
manufacturer, or landscaper may have to hire up to 30 U.S. em-
ployees a year just to keep ten job slots filled. 5'
Some scholars have theorized that there is no way to reduce
the demand for illegal laborers in this market to attract a legal work
force, short of raising the minimum wage, or rigorously enforcing
labor standards and encouraging the unionization of the dominant
industries. 52 Others suggest that even these changes might not be
enough because they fail to account for the push factors in illegal
immigration: undocumenteds will continue to cross the border and
compete for these jobs as long as the economic, social and political
employer preferences, such as undocumenteds work harder and cost employers less in
wages and benefits.
47. BRIGGS, IMMIGRATION POLICY, supra note 19, at 165.
48. Mines, Employers' Use of Low-Wage Immigrants in California: A Dilemma
for Liberals 24 (1985) (unpublished paper). Degradation may take the form of de-
pressed wages or poorer working conditions. See infra text accompanying notes 66-67;
see also V. BRIGGS, IMMIGRATION POLICY, supra note 19, at 165; infra text accompany-
ing note 59.
49. P. Martin, supra, note 30, at 22.
50. V. BRIGGS, IMMIGRATION POLICY, supra note 19, at 162 (citing P. DOER-
INGER AND M. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS
(1971)).
51. P. Martin, supra note 30, at 14.
52. See e.g., Mines, supra note 48, at 27-28; Cornelius, Mexican Migration to the
United States: The Limits of Government Intervention, WORKING PAPERS IN U.S.-
MEXICAN STUDIES 10 (1981) [hereinafter, Limits of Government Intervention].
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conditions in their native countries remain bleak. 53 Push factors
notwithstanding, the immigrant network recruitment practices, dis-
cussed below, may also continue to make the secondary market the
domain of recent immigrants.
III. U.S. BORN MINORITIES AND UNDOCUMENTEDS Do NOT
COMPETE FOR THE SAME JOBS.
A. There is No Correlation Between Minority Unemployment and
Employment of Undocumenteds.
Some proponents of the displacement theory claim that job loss
is experienced most profoundly by U.S. minority workers, a close
substitute for undocumenteds in terms of skills, age, formal educa-
tion, and prior experience. 54 However, there is no proven correla-
tion between minority unemployment and the employment of
undocumented aliens.
In congressional testimony, the United States Chamber of
Commerce has claimed that in cities where the unemployment rate
was low, there was actually a high concentration of undocumented
workers and vice-versa. Cities having a black unemployment rate
of 10.7%, according to the Chamber, had large concentrations of
undocumenteds, whereas cities with a higher black unemployment
rate had even smaller numbers of undocumented workers.55 The
General Accounting Office has attempted to compare overall unem-
ployment levels with immigration rates. Their only data base was
composed of studies of legal immigrants. Their review of the litera-
ture suggested a possible interaction between general labor market
conditions and the effect of immigration on job displacement, i.e.
when employment opportunities are relatively few, increased immi-
gration increases unemployment while the opposite occurs in peri-
ods with many employment opportunities. Nonetheless, G.A.O.
concluded that the "analysis [of previous studies] does not prove
such a relationship.
' 56
An Urban Institute study of California's recent immigrants as-
serts that the influx of immigrants in that state did not discourage
53. V. BRIGGS, IMMIGRATION POLICY, supra note 19, at 163.
54. See, e.g., V. BRIGGS, IMMIGRATION POLICY, supra, note 19, at 249; North &
Houstoun, supra note 41, at 229, 231; D. HUDDLE, supra note 46, at I1.
55. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982: Hearings on S. 997 Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (statement
of Robert Thompson).
56. U.S. G.A.O. (1986), supra note 40, at 14-16 (discussing study by Simon and
Moore, The Effect of Immigration Upon Unemployment: An Across-City Estimation
(1984) (unpublished paper)). The second GAO report examined wage data in commu-
nities that differed on the presence of immigrant workers, both documented and un-
documented, but was unable to conclude that a wage difference associated with these
workers' presence reflects a downward pressure on U.S. employees' wages. U.S. GAO
(1988), supra note 40, at 24, 26-27.
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people from seeking employment. Despite mass immigration into
Southern California, unemployment rates in the 1970's rose less rap-
idly there than in the rest of the nation. This trend was found to be
consistent with prior immigration waves.
5 7
With regard to minority unemployment, the Urban Institute
reports that there was no statistical relationship, nationally, be-
tween the size of the Hispanic population (legal and undocumented)
and black unemployment figures. In fact, in the southwest metro-
politan areas, a negative relationship was said to exist between the
black unemployment rate and the size of the Mexican immigrant
population. Black teenage unemployment, typically high in urban
areas, was substantially lower in Southern California-with its esti-
mated 1.3 million immigrants-than in the nation at large.5"
In a study of Southern California, the Center for U.S.-Mexican
Studies challenges the assumption that employers prefer undocu-
menteds or legal immigrants to U.S. minorities because the former
are willing to accept lower wages, poorer conditions and more disci-
pline. The Center's employer survey indicates that domestic minor-
ity workers rarely apply for the lowest-paid, manual entry positions
or only stay at such jobs a short time.5 9
The staff of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refu-
gee Policy bemoaned the fact that there was not "much insight into
the causes of [U.S.] minority unemployment" and that there were
[n]o satisfactory explanations for the rise in black youth unemploy-
ment ... ."60 Studies that have been done conclude that a number
of factors, other than immigrant or undocumented labor, contribute
to minority unemployment. These factors range from poor school-
ing, inadequate training and racial discrimination, to change in the
organization and production methods of industry.
6 1
B. Industries Become Immigrant Dominated Through
Exclusionary Practices.
Another phenomenon explains why U.S. minorities and immi-
grants do not necessarily compete for the same jobs. Certain firms
and industries historically have been immigrant dominated.62 Eth-
57. T. MULLER, THE FOURTH WAVE: CALIFORNIA'S NEWEST IMMIGRANTS 101
(1984). See also M. VILLAPANDO, A STUDY OF THE SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT OF IL-
LEGAL ALIENS ON THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, 62 (1977).
58. T. MULLER, supra note 57, at 96-97.
59. W. CORNELIUS, L. CHAVEZ, & J. CASTRO, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS AND
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: A SUMMARY OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE, 38 (1982) [herein-
after W. CORNELIUS, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS].
60. Economic Impacts, supra note 35, at 1.
61. See Flores, supra note 31, at 302; see also W. CORNELIUS, MEXICAN IMMI-
GRANTS, supra note 59, at 39-41.
62. See, e.g., S. Maram, Hispanic Workers in the Garment and Restaurant Indus-
tries in Los Angeles County, WORKING PAPERS IN U.S.-MEXICAN STUDIES, 7, 66
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nic or national kinship networks are often responsible for channel-
ing new immigrants into certain job categories where the same
ethnic group or nationality already predominates. This referral
process, whereby vacancies are filled by relatives or friends of cur-
rent employees, tends to offset the argument that U.S. born workers
and immigrants compete for the same jobs.
63
Sometimes these "ethnic enclave" firms have been started by
second-generation entrepreneurs who continue to "hire their own"
in the lower-echelon positions.64 Sometimes the networks are en-
couraged through "lead people" or recruiters who are oriented to
particular immigrant employee pools. Economist Mines, who has
looked closely at Hispanic network practices, reports that at many
firms these "entrenched.. .networks have made life uncomfortable
for newcomers of other ethnic groups."
'65
The process is not totally benign. Often, the result is to weaken
unionized industries which slowly degrade labor markets to the
point domestic workers will not seek jobs in them. One tactic is for
unionized firms to tap into recent immigrant networks and form
new firms to underbid the offer of their own sister firms. This so-
called "double-breasting" tactic is complemented by INS raids at
job sites with high pay scales, unions, and mainly legal crews. The
disruption in work and harassment of employees coupled with un-
derbidding from non-union competitor firms does not free up any
new jobs for domestic workers. In fact, it leads to further job oppor-
tunities for undocumented immigrants in the poorer sister firms. A
second tactic is to move from master contracts negotiated between
several firms and one union to individual collective bargaining
agreements between each firm and the union. A third tactic is to
increase employee turnover by taking advantage of the more than
adequate supply of immigrant labor.
66
Once a firm has established a reputation for excluding domes-
tic workers, these workers tend to stay away because the firm's ex-
clusionary practices and lower wages and work standards cannot
compete with the relatively greater number of job options available
to them.67 However, it is questionable whether the elimination of
(1980). See also Mines, California's Farm Workers: Survey Results of the Univ. of
California-Employment Development Dept. Survey of 1983, 67-68 (1985) (unpublished
paper).
63. W. CORNELIUS, supra note 59, at 36-37. See also, Martin, supra note 30, at 15-
18, discussing ethnic recruitment networks.
64. Cornelius, The Role of Mexican Labor in the U.S. Economy: Two Generations
of Research 8-9 (1984) (unpublished paper) [hereinafter Cornelius, Two Generations].
65. Mines, supra note 48, at 13.
66. Id. at 22-25. See also Cornelius, Two Generations, supra note 64, at 11.
67. Cornelius, Two Generations, supra note 64, at 13-14. See also D. HUDDLE,
supra note 46, at 12.
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these sources of employment for undocumenteds will lead to more
jobs for U.S. workers.
IV. REMOVAL OF UNDOCUMENTED LABOR COULD MEAN JOBS
GOING TO MACHINES AND OVERSEAS WORKERS
There is an assumption by displacement adherents that if em-
ployers did not have an available supply of undocumented aliens,
wages would simply be bid up and work conditions improved to a
level acceptable enough to attract domestic workers. 6
A. Mechanization, Relocation Or Closure Could Result From
Departure of Undocumenteds.
In fact, the removal of undocumented laborers does not neces-
sarily translate into more jobs for U.S. employees. Their removal
might mean mechanization, automation or going out of business.
69
Relocation outside the country is another option.
70
Some firms employ undocumented workers because it is the
only way they can keep an edge on foreign or other domestic com-
petition. Reducing costs and increasing productivity is their key to
survival. 7 ' Economist Martin has noted that the availability of
cheap immigrant labor preserves many establishments and jobs
which might otherwise vanish in the face of competition from more
efficiently-run rivals.
72
The Urban Institute made the same observation in studying
one local economy. The study concluded that had there been no
immigration from Mexico during the 1970's, the next decade would
have seen a reduction of 36,000 jobs in Los Angeles in such indus-
tries as furniture, apparel, textiles and leather.73 "Smaller, less-effi-
cient establishments and illegal alien workers tend to go
together."
' 74
The internationalization of labor markets cannot be ignored as
wage scales in the U.S. become increasingly sensitized to wage
68. See, e.g., V. BRIGGS, IMMIGRATION POLICY, supra note 19, at 163-65; Wachter,
The Labor Market and Illegal Immigration: The Outlookfor the 1980's, 33 INDUS. LAB.
REL. REV. 350 (1980).
69. Bracamonte, The National Labor Relations Act and Undocumented Workers:
The DeAlienation of American Labor, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 38 (1983).
70. Piore, "The Illegal Aliens" Debate Misses the Boat, Working Papersfor a New
Society (1978), cited in SELECT COMMISSION, supra note 41, at 512 (1981). See also, P.
ERLICH, supra note 33, at 195. A case in point is the rapidly growing twin-plant or
maquiladora program: Raw goods from the U.S. are shipped to Mexico where they are
manufactured in low wage plants owned by the "who's who of corporate America" and
exported back to the U.S. under reduced tariffs. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1986 at 1, col.2.
71. Cornelius, Two Generations, supra note 64, at 11.
72. Martin, The Future of International Labor Migration, reprinted in SELECT
COMMISSION, supra note 41, App. B: Papers on International Migration 327 (1981).
73. T. MULLER, supra note 57, at 148.
74. Martin, supra note 72, at 327.
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scales elsewhere in the world. 75 In short, the goods might still be
produced, but the jobs might go to machines or workers in other
countries-rather than Americans.
B. Employment of Undocumented Aliens May Even Create Jobs
In some instances, the employment of undocumented workers
may actually lead to job creation. Ironically, writes Professor Jos6
Bracamonte, the removal of undocumented foreign workers may
mean loss of employment for native workers. 7
6
A Wall Street Journal editorial of the last decade commented
on the positive impact of undocumented laborers in New York: "...
the illegal may well be providing the margin for survival for entire
sections of the economy .... ",77 A more recent Rand Corporation
report made similar findings about immigration in California. Mex-
ican immigrants "may actually have stimulated manufacturing em-
ployment by keeping wages competitive.
'7 8
Immigrants create jobs in several ways. The unskilled, who
count most of the undocumented among them, provide opportuni-
ties higher on the job ladder for native-born, English-speaking
workers to improve their work status. Immigrants also create addi-
tional jobs by spending dollars on goods and services in a particular
area. 79 The ethnic entrepreneurs may do particularly well owing to
the employment of cheap undocumented workers and the eth-
nic-specific consumer demand which generates these businesses.
8 0
V. THE No-WORK RULE SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FOR
OTHER REASONS
A. Bonded-Out Aliens Applying for Work Authorization Are Few
in Number.
The denial of work permits warrants re-examination, if for no
other reason than the small number of persons potentially affected
by the contested regulations. Only an estimated 41,712 aliens in the
entire country were released on bond or own recogniznce pending
deportation hearings during fiscal year 1986.81 The number of
75. Cornelius, Limits of Government Intervention, supra note 52, at 7.
76. Bracamonte, supra note 69, at 38.
77. Wall St. J., June 21, 1977, at 8, col. I.
78. See McCarthy and Burciaga Valdez, supra note 37 at 20. See also comments of
former Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall in Immigration: An International Perspective,
18 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 593, 597 (1984); and, T. MULLER, supra note 57, at 149.
79. See T. MULLER, supra note 57, at 102, 149.
80. Cirdenas, The Impact of Immigration in the Ethnic Enterprise (1983) (unpub-
lished paper), cited in Flores, supra note 31, at 9.
81. Letter from INS Director of Congressional and Public Affairs to Representa-




bonded-out aliens represents a small percentage of job-holders or
job-seekers when compared to an estimated national work force of
almost 112.5 million. 82 These individuals tend to be stable and ac-
tive members of their communities, a number of whom have Ameri-
can citizen children.83 These family ties make many such persons
documentable. Applicants for employment authorization, therefore,
are a small group, whether compared to other aliens or to U.S.
workers.
B. INS Is Not Expert in Consideration of Labor Implications.
In its response to public comment, INS has already conceded
that it lacks the expertise to define and quantify undocumented
aliens' impact upon the dislocation of American workers. Under
the proposed rule, this was one of the factors to be considered in
authorizing employment, 4 but it was deleted from the final rule.
85
Similarly, INS withdrew a proposed factor which would have re-
quired the agency to consider the number of aliens involved in un-
authorized employment before granting work permission to new
applicants. INS felt that these factors were more appropriately a
function of the Department of Labor than the Immigration and
Naturalization Service or its parent agency, the Department of
Justice.86
Given the agency's own admission of inadequacy in measuring
the degree of dislocation or unauthorized labor, INS's insistence
that it is capable of "safeguarding employment opportunities" and
that its district directors are the authorities "best able" to act on
employment applications, is troubling. 87 Labor Economist Vernon
Briggs, who does not dismiss the need for regulating undocumented
workers, writes that the immigration laws enacted since World War
II "manifest [ ] a complete disregard on the part of policy makers in
the labor force implications of the legislation."' 88 He notes that the
disinterest was apparent since 1940 when responsibility for immi-
gration matters was shifted from the Department of Labor to the
Justice Department. 89 Briggs charges that:
[t]he former agency gives priority to the employment and income
implications of the statutes it administers and it has traditionally
82. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, States: Employment
Status of the Experienced Civilian Labor Force .. , Table 16 (1984).
83. Hearing supra note 39 at 85. Some of these aliens may even be eligible for
legalization or Special Agricultural Worker status under § 245A and § 210 of the INA,
as amended by IRCA. § 1255a and § 1160.
84. 48 Fed.Reg. 8821 (1983).
85. 48 Fed.Reg. 51144 (1983).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 51143.




relied on a trained bureaucracy to resolve difficult and contested
issues. The latter agency has neither the expertise nor the desire
to give priority to labor market considerations of the nation's im-
migration statutes .... 90
The Board of Immigration Appeals has also recognized the key role
played by the Labor Department in administering portions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act and the importance of paying
close attention to the Act's labor aspects at the micro level. In Mat-
ter of Vea, the Board deferred to findings made by the Secretary of
Labor, in connection with labor certification proceedings, that em-
ployment of certain aliens might be "detrimental to the United
States labor market ...." 9, It was unwilling to give unbridled au-
thority to INS to make the same determination.
9 2
Thus, even if employment of undocumented aliens does harm
the interests of domestic employees, the agency designated to imple-
ment the regulations lacks the requisite expertise.
VI. CONCLUSION
The so-called "second generation of research" 9 3 concludes that
removal of undocumented aliens is not necessarily the answer to
U.S. unemployment, depressed wages, and deteriorating work con-
ditions. A whole host of factors is responsible for these conditions,
only one of which may in certain circumstances be the presence of
undocumented workers.
Given the limited understanding of labor's ills, the lack of con-
sistent and reliable data, the de minimis numbers of aliens seeking
authorization to work pending an immigration hearing, and INS's
lack of expertise, the government would be acting hastily and un-
wisely in implementing the cure called for by the INS. Imposing a
no-work restriction on alien bonds would have no relation to the
protection of American workers and would further prejudice the
already limited due process which is accorded aliens facing deporta-
tion or exclusion.
90. Id.
91. 18 I.&.N. Dec. 171, 175 (B.I.A.) (1981).
92. Id.
93. Cornelius, Two Generations, supra note 64, at 4-5.
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